With President Trump winning the 2024 election, policy analysts who work on sub-Saharan Africa wonder what this will mean for his next term. Given President Trump’s preference for transactional relationships, coupled with the de-prioritization of sub-Saharan Africa by both Republican and Democratic administrations, we can expect that not much will change. As was done in the first term, the Trump administration is expected to focus heavily on private sector engagement without regard to human rights issues. President Trump has demonstrated he is content to work with those who commit human rights violations as long as he sees benefit. However, if the Trump administration wishes to succeed in growing private sector engagement, it cannot afford to forget about human rights.
U.S.-Africa policy has historically received bi-partisan support, contributing to its continuity regardless of a change in administration. In recent years, consensus has shifted to an agreed need to counter the perceived threat to U.S. interests of an increasingly engaged China on the African continent. Looking back at both 2016 Trump administration and the 2020 Biden administration, more time and resources have gone into private sector engagement – in a concerted effort to counter Chinese (and increasingly Russian) influence than toward strengthening civil society or supporting human rights. Thus far, there is no indication a second Trump administration would offer anything different.
Trump’s Narrow U.S.-Africa Policy
When the Trump administration rolled out its U.S.-Africa strategy in 2018, it failed to mention the words, “human rights.” The strategy, however, mentioned China multiple times. To compete with China’s “no strings approach,” the administration doubled down on opportunities for U.S. investment in Africa. The signature policy launched under the strategy, Prosper Africa, sought to set up “deal teams” in U.S. Embassy hubs in various countries that could help facilitate U.S. company bids on projects across Africa.
Beyond strategy papers and plans, senior Trump officials shied away from human rights issues in their sporadic engagements with sub-Saharan Africa. When there was a comment on human rights issues on behalf of the administration, these primarily came from the Assistant Secretary for Africa. Neither Secretary of State Tillerson (who was fired while on his only trip to Africa) nor Secretary of State Pompeo (who made one, three-country visit) prioritized Africa during their tenure, and neither had significant or meaningful civil society engagement on their trip agendas.
The Trump administration’s decision to quickly endorse the 2019 DRC elections is another example. While Congolese monitors disputed the election results, the U.S. accepted them. Many analysts believe this was political expediency to ensure that the incoming DRC president would be someone the U.S. could readily work with on private sector investment, especially mining Congo’s vast mineral resources.
Finally, the Trump administration’s decision to have the Treasury Secretary lead the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam negotiations was a clear indication of the lens through which they viewed diplomatic engagement. This decision not only sidelined State Department officials but ensured the U.S. would only look at this issue through the lens of strategic interests with Egypt rather than the broader risks that this regional dispute could cause.
Private Sector Investment Important, but Without Rights is Unsustainable
For too long, the United States has failed to recognize and engage with countries in Africa for their diversity, ingenuity, and mutually beneficial opportunities. Recent U.S. investments that seek to create employment opportunities for young people can help political stability as well as counter violent extremism. Building up infrastructure supports local manufacturing, connects rural communities and can uplift whole economies.
Yet making these investments without accompanying them with support for human rights priorities, including the recognition of the important oversight role of civil society, undermines these efforts. Investment and private sector engagement alone will have limited success if local communities are marginalized, their rights undermined and the governance structures in place do not allow people to play a critical role in responsible resource management. For example, oil developments in northern Mozambique, like other resource-rich countries in Africa,have yet to benefit local communities.
Organizations like Amnesty International have documented human rights violations by Mozambican security forces in response to armed groups that have disrupted operations – actions that have been counterproductive to stabilizing the region. Not only are Mozambicans not benefiting from their own resource wealth but are suffering additional violations at the hands of the security forces focused on protecting the investment rather than the local communities.
In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Amnesty has documented forced evictions and violations around the Cobalt mines that the U.S. so keenly wants to be part of, leading to reputational risk for the U.S. companies who want to invest and a conflict of interest within U.S. foreign policy between promoting human rights and securing resources.It would be a mistake to continue this trajectory. The U.S. cannot successfully grow private sector engagement in Africa if it loses sight of human rights, accountability and the rule of law as central components of its engagements with Africa.
Private sector engagement is important and should be a top policy priority. While Africa has often been deprioritized in commercial engagement and investment, this increased engagement is welcome and should be the minimum for a standard of engagement. The United States should want to invest in African futures because it is a mutually beneficial opportunity, and Africans should have choices in how they partner and invest. However, to do so without an equal focus on governance and human rights is unsustainable. The U.S. has been on this unsustainable path for too long, and it is time for a shift.
A Necessary Policy Shift
For Trump’s second administration, the U.S. needs to shift its U.S.-Africa policy.
Project 2025 offers some details on what we can expect for his second term. Sub-Saharan Africa gets little mention, but where it appears, it once again homes in on countering Chinese influence without acknowledging the importance of Africa on its own. We can also expect continued unwavering support to African Presidents who align with U.S. foreign policy objectives regardless of their domestic human rights record; and a likely renewed relationship with military-led and less democratically minded governments where countering violent extremism is still a top priority. We should also expect increased private sector engagement at the expense of human rights when attempting to secure strategic minerals.
And, with the ongoing conflicts in Gaza and Ukraine taking up significant senior-level attention, there is likely to be little appetite to re-imagine Africa policy. Once again, Africa will be neglected in U.S. policy.
It doesn’t have to be this way—and it would be foolish to continue along this path. President Trump would be wise to realize the strategic importance of a sustainable U.S.-Africa policy to overall U.S. foreign policy. And further, without the promotion of human rights and responsible government as a key component of U.S.-Africa policy, none of the U.S. Government’s other policy objectives can be sustainably realized. President Trump must be prepared to publicly call out human rights violations and not just raise concerns in closed-door settings. Trade deals should include human rights protections for workers, and human rights provisions must be maintained in any new Africa Growth and Opportunity Act.
Officials from the Department of Treasury or Commerce should also ensure that human rights concerns are talking points with interlocutors when they travel to Africa. They, along with other U.S. Government officials, should ensure they meet not just with government counterparts but also civil society when they travel so they can hear on-the-ground concerns about how U.S. policy is impacting the human rights environment. If these steps are taken, this administration will send a much clearer signal that human rights are central to U.S. policy.
Human rights, the rule of law, and accountability must be respected and prioritized regardless of short-term strategic interests. The U.S.’s own human rights record and inability to maintain consistency in its human rights policies means it lacks credibility when it engages on these issues with other countries. While the U.S. is imperfect in upholding human rights principles, human rights activists around the world still look to the U.S. and the broader international community to support their efforts when governments violate regional and international human rights norms.
This administration must realize that upholding human rights is not a distraction from a sustainable and successful U.S.-Africa policy, it is very much in line with its own strategic interests.