Amnesty International AI Index: AFR 54/007/2008

SUDAN

UNAMID UPDATE: TIME FOR EFFECTIVE ACTION

7 February 2008

"UNAMID....is an unprecedented joint operation. It reflects our shared determination to end the tragedy in Darfur once and for all." United Nations Secretary-General Ban ki-Moon's address to the African Union Summit, 31 January 2008.

The UN Security Council is responsible for ensuring that UNAMID -- the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur -- has the resources and room for manoeuver needed to fulfill its mandate. Having passed Resolution 1769, it must now ensure that the resolution is implemented. The Security Council's debate on Darfur, on scheduled for 8 February 2008, is an opportunity to make progress in finding solutions to resource gaps, particularly the shortage of helicopters, in applying pressure on the Government of Sudan to accept the list of troop contributing countries, and in ensuring that sufficient well-resourced and trained troops are promptly deployed.

Even without the full complement of necessary resources, UNAMID can still enhance the protection of displaced persons and other civilians. There should be no delays in increasing its patrolling and outreach activities.

The Security Council should not accept the possibility of failure in Darfur because of inadequate resources. Members of the Security Council who have the enablers -- in particular, the helicopters - should provide them or ensure they are provided. This should now be considered a priority. As a matter of urgency all options must be explored, including the immediate transfer of helicopters from other UN operations where the need for immediate transport by air is less urgent.

Although UNAMID is now deployed in Darfur, replacing the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), the Government of Sudan is still frustrating its full deployment. On 7 January Sudanese government forces fired at an UNAMID supply convoy travelling in north Darfur at night, severely injuring the driver. UNAMID had informed the Government of Sudan of the convoy's departure and route.¹

It is imperative that the pitfalls which made AMIS unable to protect civilians effectively are avoided. UNAMID should be provided with the means to ensure that civilians are protected, that the internally displaced who leave their camp are not raped, killed or harassed and that humanitarian convoys are not attacked.

Resources and missing resources

• Personnel: Rather than being a peacekeeping force of more than 26,000 troops, police and civilian personnel, as set out in Security Council Resolution 1769, the total military personnel of UNAMID in January 2008 was 6,880 troops and 645 staff officers and military observers. In addition there were 1,550 police. This represents an increase in troop levels of about 1,400 over the AMIS force in November 2007. Sudan has still not accepted the list of troop contributing countries presented in September 2007 and has obstructed deployment of specialized troops considered necessary for the force: a Thai infantry unit; two Nepalese special forces units; and a Scandinavian engineering unit. There are concerns that some of the UNAMID troops in Darfur have not been adequately trained for such a complex mission.

• Civil and Political Affairs: One weakness of AMIS was its lack of adequate personnel trained to deal with civil and political affairs, essential for building good relations with different political and armed groupings, including Arab and non-Arab ethnic groups. Only by such outreach work, supporting, where possible, local attempts at reconciliation, can a safe environment be built up for people in Darfur. Such an environment would allow humanitarians and UNAMID to move about without fear. Amnesty International understands that it is highly unlikely that sufficient civil and political personnel to perform this vital role will be deployed in Darfur for at least four months.

• Helicopters: UNAMID has still not received the 24 helicopters the UN asked for which are necessary to make UN forces mobile in Sudan.² Without helicopters UNAMID is unable to deploy troops to deal with crises, and military or civilian observers cannot investigate incidents which occur in insecure areas. Amnesty International has learned that there were incidents where the Government of Sudan refused AMIS permission for the medical evacuation by helicopter of injured persons. The government of Sudan must allow UNAMID to operate freely within the terms of the UN mandate.

• Land transport: UNAMID still lacks adequate and appropriate ground transport equipment. Canada provided AMIS with 105 armoured personnel carriers (APCs) in 2005, which now are operated by UNAMID. UNAMID drivers need to be trained, and there is a Canadian task force which is carrying out the training. However, given the fact that many UNAMID personnel only have six-month contracts, by the time drivers are trained, after some six weeks, they only have four months driving time - still as inexperienced drivers - before they leave. It would clearly be better if trained APC drivers were brought in from the countries which have them.³

• Customs and visas: Obstruction by the Sudanese government still adversely affects operations. The government of Sudan demanded the payment of customs duties for UNAMID equipment including communications equipment and other necessities in Port Sudan, in the process delaying UNAMID's operations. The goods were eventually let through without payment according to the government's agreement with the UN, but only after significant delays. Visas have been similarly delayed.

• Status of Forces Agreement: The negotiation of the Status of Forces Agreement took until 4 February 2008, when it was announced that the Agreement was to be signed. However, two dates set for its signature have not been met. The UN Secretary-General stated on 6 February 2008 that the Status of Forces Agreement would be signed this week. For UNAMID to be effective the Status of Forces Agreement must include

  • freedom of movement in Darfur without the need to inform the Government of Sudan;

  • the right to operate at night, including night flights and night patrols;

  • the right to ensure that the Government of Sudan is not allowed to disrupt communications.

UNAMID on the ground in Darfur

UNAMID has carried out positive gestures but must be more proactive on the ground if it is to gain the confidence of all groups in Darfur.

• The internally displaced: Before and after the handover on 31 December 2007, UNAMID has tried to start and maintain a dialogue with the internally displaced, in particular by making a point of visiting the camps and listening to the problems of the displaced.

• Patrols: By the end of 2007 AMIS was often only going on one patrol a day. UNAMID's average number of daily patrols in January 2008, though still insufficient, was 16.

• Investigations: It is vitally important that serious human rights violations should be urgently and independently investigated. There is a danger that UNAMID may be held back in this respect, both by the lack of helicopters and other transport and by security guidelines which have often prevented UN human rights monitors and other civilian personnel from travelling to areas which are considered unsafe. On 24 January a force of Janjawid, allegedly supported by the Sudan Armed Forces, attacked the village of Saraf Jidad in West Darfur. They killed some 23 people, mostly farmers, including the Fursha (chief) of the area; his brother, a nurse; teachers; and three women. The town was virtually destroyed. UNAMID only investigated the attack more than a week later, on 3 February.

RECOMMENDATIONS

What the Security Council should do

The Security Council should ensure that UNAMID has the resources needed to operate according to its mandate, in particular helicopters. Provisional solutions could be the transfer of some helicopters from other UN operations where the need is less urgent, or the acceptance of the Jordanian offer of a helicopter unit; even though they are short-range helicopters, they would still enhance operational capability. In addition, the Security Council should put pressure on the Government of Sudan to accept the list of troop contributing countries. Further, it must ensure that sufficient well-resourced and trained troops, as well as a strong civil and political affairs component, are promptly deployed to Darfur. The civil and political affairs component of UNAMID should maintain relations with all parties to the conflict and with the civilian population including the displaced and the diverse communities in Darfur, Arab and non-Arab.

What UNAMID should do

Even without the full complement of necessary resources UNAMID should still be able to act now as an effective force which is able to protect displaced persons and other civilians, act on serious human rights violations and ensure the security necessary for reconciliation between the different forces and ethnic groups in Darfur.

1. Constant patrolling round camps: Most human rights violations against internally displaced persons take place when they leave their camps to collect firewood or go to market. The environment is such that UNAMID forces could promptly come to agreements with camp leaders to provide patrols to accompany them. There are 65 camps for displaced persons and 32 UNAMID team sites throughout Darfur; there should be no fewer than 32 patrols a day.

2. Patrolling the roads: If roads between camps, towns and villages are frequently patrolled they are more likely to become safe for travellers and vehicles. This has been shown in areas where patrols have taken place. It is important that such patrols frequently visit villages and settlements in order to build a feeling of security among the local civilian population.

3. Night patrols: Under AMIS, reportedly only the South African troops carried out night patrols. If UNAMID forces do not carry out 24-hour patrols, they are allowing other armed groups, including Janjawid, to control the area.

4. Outreach: Patrolling is ineffective if it is not accompanied by outreach to the local population, Arabs and non-Arabs, including building trust and acting on reports of human rights violations.

5. Investigations: It is imperative that UNAMID should be able to promptly investigate serious human rights violations and actions which endanger the safety of civilians.

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